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Abstract—The trustworthiness of vehicle messages is a major
focus in intelligent transportation research. Existing studies focus
on enhancing the accuracy of credibility evaluation, overlooking
that the transmission performance may affect the quality of
vehicle messages which are essential for implementing credibility
evaluation. This letter improves vehicle trust management in
a dense vehicle network by regulating vehicle transmissions.
Through strategically scheduling vehicle transmissions to avoid
interference between vehicles while guaranteeing sufficient num-
bers of vehicles transmitting their sensor data, vehicle messages
can reliably yet timely arrive at Road Side Units (RSUs) without
missing reporting an event on the road.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an intelligent transport network, vehicles automatically
send messages to Road Side Units (RSUs) to report an
emergency event, road conditions, traffic situations, keepalive
Hellos, etc. These messages are then used by RSUs or other
central intelligent devices to analyse the situations of vehicles
and roads, so as to make appropriate action decisions for the
transport network. The credibility/trustworthiness of vehicle
messages is hence crucial for the smooth operations of intel-
ligent transport networks.
Much research effort has been spent on various trustworthi-
ness algorithms. Some studies focus on efficiently evaluating
the received incident report by the centralised server [1], [2],
while others [3], [4] discuss that how the surrounding vehicles
use the received information or historic vehicle behaviours
to update the credibility of the sending vehicle. However,
no study considers that simultaneous transmissions of vehicle
messages may interfere with each other due to the wireless
broadcast property. Such interference easily causes packet
loss, data errors, or long transmission delays [5], negatively
affecting the report quality received at RSUs [6].
This letter investigates how to support accurate trust man-
agement in vehicle networks by improving vehicle transmis-
sion experience. In detail, an RSU in our system forms a
detection zone to limit the number of vehicles sending reports
to an RSU. Within each detection zone, vehicles are ranked
based on their credibility. To select the vehicles that will report
events, we use the ranking of vehicles inside a detection zone.
In addition to referring to the ranking of vehicles within a
detection zone, the distances between vehicles are taken into
account in order to avoid the interference between vehicle
transmissions.
Our Network Simulator 2 (NS2) simulation results show that
our scheme greatly helps existing schemes [2], [4] to achieve
a report loss rate < 10% with acceptable average report delays
when vehicles send the emergency reports to the RSU.
II. RELATED WORK
Many existing solutions for the trustworthiness of vehicle
networks, the trustworthiness solutions utilize vehicles, RSUs,
cloud servers and blockchain to monitor and record the ma-
licious behaviours of reporting vehicles. For instance, the ve-
hicular cloud in [2] is an emerging form of vehicular networks
where cloud features are leveraged for enhanced computation
and maintenance. However, the cloud solution is not practical
to cope with large numbers of vehicles, resulting in high
latency. To reduce the high latency, Huang et al. [7] introduced
a recommendation based trust management solution to utilize
direct or indirect communication among vehicles to share the
misbehaviour of a reporting vehicle. Although the proposed
solutions reduce the computation and transmission delays, it
introduces new conspiracy attacks [8]. As a security solution
for the consensus issue, the blockchain technology has been
leveraged for trust establishment in vehicular networks. Yang
et al. [4] proposed a decentralized trust management system
that develops a blockchain based trustworthiness solution to
address the consistent data issue. The existing solutions do
not take into account the impact on quality of service (QoS)
particularly in a dense traffic scenario [9], which may lead to
a large transmission delay and a high report loss rate.
To the best of our knowledge, the state-of-the-art in the
intelligent transport network does not take into account the
impact of the transmission quality on the effectiveness of
credibility evaluation or trust management. In particular, when
multiple adjacent vehicles send the emergency reports simul-
taneously, the transmissions of their reports may interfere
with each other due to the wireless broadcast property. Such
interference easily causes packet loss, data error, or long trans-
mission delays. We hence presents a new vehicle transmission
scheme to address the concerns that have been overlooked in
the literature.
III. THE VEHICLE MESSAGE SCHEDULING ALGORITHM
(VMS)
Denote an RSU as R. In our system, instead of asking all
vehicles to report a road event, R selects a subset of vehicles in
its coverage to report a road event. The selection of this subset
of vehicles is not trivial as it is hard to predict where on a road
an event would happen and each vehicle has a limited accurate
detection distance. Our idea is to divide the coverage of the
RSU R into a controlled number of detection zones (DZs).
Vehicles are dynamically allocated to these DZs based on their
instantaneous locations. Within each DZ, the vehicle selection
scheme is designed to select event reporting vehicles based on
their rankings. Our VMS algorithm ensures that events can be
detected and accurately reported no matter where on the road
such events take place.
A. Formation of Detection Zones
The formation of DZs is implemented by R. In order to
allow vehicles inside a DZ to accurately sense events in this
zone, R forms DZs by referring to the accurate detection
distance of vehicles. Meanwhile, in order to efficiently control
the number of DZs within R’s coverage, our DZs are in the
shape of cubes (as shown in Fig. 1). This is because cubes
not only may fully cover R’s coverage without overlaps but
also require relatively simple calculations as compared to other
shapes.
Without loss of generality, assume R locates at (0, 0, 0) and
the accurate detection distance of vehicles in our system is d.
R forms the first DZ by regarding itself as the central point of
the cube. Then, in order to guarantee that any vehicles inside
this DZ can accurately sense events in this zone, the longest
distance in this DZ, i.e., the length of a diagonal line (shown
by the blue dotted line in Fig.1), should be ≤ d. To form
the DZ as large as possible, helping to reduce the number of
DZs, we use d as the length of a diagonal line in our DZs.
Therefore, the sides of the DZ should have the length s as
(
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Fig. 1. An example of forming detection zones.
With the side value of the DZ, it is not hard to obtain the
eight vertices as illustrated by red numbers in Fig.1. More






































































































eight vertices define the first DZ.
Once the first DZ is established, R selects a face on this
DZ to support the formation of further DZs. Without loss of
generality, R first selects the face having the vertices 1, 2,
3, and 4. This next DZ is also a cube sharing the selected
face with the first DZ. Therefore, the other four vertices of


























































centre of the face formed by these four new vertices can be






). We call the Euclidean distance
between R and this centre as the distance covered by the two
DZs (denoted as d′). If r > d′, where r is the radius of R’s
coverage, R forms another DZ sharing the latestly formed face.
The procedure continues until r ≤ d′.
R then starts the second procedure by forming a new DZ
sharing the face defined by the vertices 1, 2, 5, and 6 on
the first DZ, using the same procedure as above. R continues
forming further DZs until the distance covered by all DZs
formed in this second procedure is ≥ r. When the second
procedure completes, R starts the third procedure by forming
a new DZ sharing the face defined by the vertices 1, 4, 5,
and 8 on the first DZ. The third procedure completes once the
distance covered by all DZs formed in this procedure is ≥ r.
Similarly, R forms more DZs by referring to other five faces
on the first DZ.
We call all the space inside established DZs as covered
space. Once the DZs along the six faces of the first DZ have
been formed, R continues establishing new DZs in order to
extend the covered space to the whole coverage of R. Without
loss of generality, R uses the secondly established DZ as the
reference DZ to continue the DZ formation along those faces
on this reference zone that do not have adjacent DZs. If all the
covered space by these new DZs and those already established
DZs in previous procedures does not fill R’s coverage, R uses
the third established DZ as the reference zone to form more
DZs. The process continues until the covered space by all DZs
fills R’s coverage. The formation of DZs then completes. We
consider the z-axis when dividing DZ, because we consider
that some vehicles may observe accidents from vertical space,
such as vehicles on viaducts.
B. Vehicle-Zone Allocation and Vehicle Ranking
Once R has divided its coverage into a number of DZs, the
next step is to allocate vehicles on the road to a DZ based on
the vehicles location coordinates. Like most vehicle networks,
in our system, vehicles periodically send Hello messages. A
Hello message generated by our vehicles contains three fields:
vehicle ID, the coordinates of vehicle’s current location, and
vehicle’s speed. A vehicle may obtain its current location
coordinates by global positioning system (GPS) [10], etc. R
extracts the vehicle’s current location coordinates from the
periodical Hello messages.
Suppose a vehicle’s current location is (x, y, z), R allocates
this vehicle to a specific DZ by comparing (x, y, z) with
DZs’ coordinate boundaries. More specifically, for the ith
DZ (i ∈ [0, n− 1]), where n is the total number of DZs
in R’s coverage, we let xi,min, yi,min, and zi,min be the
minimum values of all points in this DZ on the x, y and
z axes, respectively, and xi,max, yi,max, and zi,max be the
maximum values. R compares x with xi,min and xi,max, y
with yi,min and yi,max, and z with zi,min and zi,max. The
vehicle is allocated to the ith DZ only when the vehicle’s
coordinates meet xi,min ≤ x ≤ xi,max, yi,min ≤ y ≤ yi,max,
and zi,min ≤ z ≤ zi,max. The relationship between a vehicle
and a DZ is dynamic as the vehicle keeps moving. By the
above way, based on the latest Hello messages, R dynamically
maps vehicles to DZs. For vehicles allocated to the same DZ,
R forms a ranking list by sorting all vehicles in descending
order of their credibility.
A vehicle ranking list associated with a DZ dynamically
changes when a vehicles enters or leaves the DZ as below.
1) When R receives a Hello message with a vehicle ID
which is not currently on the ranking list for the DZ,
R regards the vehicle as a new one entering into the
DZ. R achieves the credibility of this vehicle from a
blockchain, a cloud server, or other devices (depending
on the employed vehicle trust management scheme [2],
[4]). R then places the ID of this vehicle on the ranking
list so that all vehicles in the DZ are ranked in the
descending order of their credibility.
2) When R has not received a Hello message, for a time
period (say 3 Hello periods), from a vehicle whose ID is
on the ranking list of the DZ, R regards that the vehicle
has left the DZ. The ID of the vehicle will hence be
removed from the ranking list, and the ranking list will
be re-ordered to include all vehicles in this DZ in the
descending order of their credibility.
Through the above steps, R completes the process of vehicle
ranking in each DZ based on their credibility.
C. Selection of Reporting Vehicles
Once the m vehicles belonging to the same DZ are ranked,
R selects m′ (m′ < m) vehicles as event reporting vehicles
in this DZ. The first vehicle selected is the one on top of the
ranking list. To select the remaining (m′ − 1) reporting vehi-
cles, R not only refers to vehicles’ credibility but also takes
into account whether vehicles interfere with those selected
reporting vehicles. In another words, R assigns a weight to
each vehicle that has not been selected as a reporting vehicle.





where i ∈ [0, n− l − 1], l is the number of currently selected
reporting vehicles, Ci is the credibility of the ith non-reporting
vehicle, Ii,j is the interference index which indicates the
interference relationship between the ith non-reporting vehicle
and the jth reporting vehicles. If the ith non-reporting vehicle
may interfere with the jth reporting vehicles, Ii,j = 1;
otherwise, Ii,j = 0. The vehicle with the largest weight is
selected a new reporting vehicle.
The weight of a non-overlapping vehicle may need to be
updated when a new reporting vehicle is selected, as the
interference index (in (1)) of this non-overlapping vehicle may
changed if the new reporting vehicle transmits. At each time
when the weights of all non-reporting vehicles are updated,
R selects a non-reporting vehicle with the largest weight as a
new reporting vehicle until m′ reporting vehicles are selected.
Then, in a similar way, R selects m′ reporting vehicles for
another DZ. Once all DZs have m′ reporting vehicles selected,
R completes the reporting vehicle selection procedure. The
reporting vehicle selection procedure is periodic, following
the periodic vehicle-zone allocations and vehicle ranking,
because the relationship between vehicles and DZs is dynamic
during vehicles’ movement. When deciding the length of such
periods, vehicles’ driving speeds, the size of DZs, and the
period of the Hello message should be referred to.
IV. SIMULATION EVALUATION
In this section, by using NS2.35, we evaluate the following
four schemes.
• The blockchain-based trust management (BCTM) [4].
It requires all vehicles that detect accidents/events to
broadcast the incident reports to the RSU. The RSU
aggregates the received reports and generates a trust rate
for each event.
• VMS-BCTM. It applies the proposed VMS to BCTM to
reduce the vehicle transmission interference.
• The neighborhood-based trust management (NBTM) [2].
It requires vehicles near to accident/event places to send
event reports. The RSU to determine the trust levels of
event reports based on the the credibility of reporting
vehicles.
• VMS-NBTM. It applies the proposed VMS to NBTM to
reduce the vehicle transmission interference.
We compare these four schemes along the two performance
metrics below.
• Report loss rate (RLR). When multiple nearby vehicles
send reports to their RSU simultaneously, reports gen-
erated by trustful vehicles may be lost due to trans-
mission interference. A large RLR means that reports
from trustful vehicles may be dropped, causing a wrong
decision making at the RSU and hence affecting the trust
management of a vehicle network. We calculate RLR by
RLR = Rt−RrRt , where Rt is the number of vehicles that
send a report and Rr is the number of reports received
at the RSU.
• Average report delay (ARD). A report delay refers to
the time period from a vehicle sending this report to




m , where m is the number of
vehicles sending a report in a DZ and RDi is the delay
of the ith vehicle’s report. Shorter ARDs are crucial for
the RSU to make timely decisions.
The major parameters employed in our simulations are listed
in Table I.
a) Evaluation of Report Loss Rate (RLR): we observe
the RLR performance changes after increasing the number
of vehicles from 3 to 23 for each DZ. As illustrated in
Fig. 2, we evaluated four schemes that we listed above. BCTM




MAC standard 802 11
Antenna OmniAntenna
The size of Hello or Report packets 100 bytes [11], [12]
The interval of Hello packets 100 ms [12]
Wireless bandwidth 1Mbps
The accurate detection range of vehicles 100 meters [13]
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Fig. 2. Analysing the report loss rates by increasing the number of vehicles.
to broadcast a report to the RSU. Followed by NBTM, when
DZ is not dense, RLR is not very high, but as the number
of DZ vehicles increases, RLR is also increasing. In contrast,
VMS-BCTM and VMS- NBTM minimise the RLR between
0% and 5% after increasing the number of vehicles in DZ.
Such a significant improvement is because VMS considers the
interference domain when selecting a vehicle. This approach
reduces RLR caused by interference.
3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23


























Fig. 3. Analysing the average report delays by increasing the vehicle density.
b) Average Report Delay (ARD): Fig. 3 shows how
ARDs can be affected by vehicle density. The contention be-
tween these simultaneous reporting causes delays in delivering
reports to the RSU. This is because the reporting vehicles
in the same carrier sense need to check the channel status
if it senses the channel state is busy. The reporting vehicle
will wait until the line is idle for transmission, which will
increase the transmission delay. The results show that as the
number of vehicles in DZ increase, the ARDs of all four
schemes increase. BCTM always generates the longest ARDs
because all vehicles need to broadcast reports to the RSU.
NBTM achieves slightly shorter ARDs (increasing from 40ms
to 380ms) because less contentions take place between vehicle
reporting activities, since only 50% vehicles send event reports
with NBTM. For VMS-BCTM and VMS-NBTM, they both
employ 30% vehicles to report events, helping them to achieve
shorter ARDs than BCTM and NBTM. Between VMS-BCTM
and VMS-NBTM, VMS-BCTM has slight longer ARDs be-
cause it asks more vehicles to report events than VMS-NBTM
does.
V. CONCLUSION
A trustworthiness assessment is a key step to guarantee the
security and reliability of information transmission in vehicle
networks. Transmitting reports with short latency and low
report loss rates in vehicle networks is the main issue that we
explore in this letter. We present a vehicle message scheduling
algorithm for the vehicle trust management system. With the
aid of this solution, the existing trustworthiness solutions can
achieve low latency and low loss rate when sending an incident
report in the high-density area. The experiment results show
that our vehicle message scheduling algorithm can surely help
a existing trust management scheme to reduce (use the full
term of ARD and RLR). Our next step is to optimise the
propose scheme as well as take further security issues (e.g.,
Sybil attacks or self-promoting attacks) into account.
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